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PUBLIC POLICY, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
SUPREME COURT
Philip B. Kurland*
I trust that you will pardon a few personal notes by way of introduction to what I have to say this evening, not so much by way
of apologia, as to indicate where I am going by telling you from
whence I come. First, however, I would remind you that this is
an essay and an essay, as Felix Frankfurter once told us, "is
tentative, reflective, suggestive, contradictory, and incomplete. It
mirrors the perversities and complexities of life."' Unfortunately,
academic lawyers, unlike scientists, never have the satisfaction of
proving their theses to be right, although they can be proved to
be wrong. In my dotage, as you will note in the text that follows,
I have taken to quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes more and more
often, for, like my parents, he has proved to grow wiser as I have
become older. Among his insights that have proved themselves
to me is his warning not to confuse the obvious with the necessary
or certitude with certainty.2 And so I claim no grasp on Truth.
I aspire only to an honest effort to reason from questionable
premises to dubious conclusions.
I confess the dreadful fact that I am only a lawyer, a lawyer
who teaches and not a scholar whose discipline is law, not a practitioner, and certainly not a statesman. I learned my law in an
old-fashioned school, by which I do not mean Harvard. I mean that

* William R. Kenan Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago. A.B.
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1. Frankfurter, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT 203 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
2. O.W. HOLMES. Naturai Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 311 (1920).
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my mentors, from whom I learned an attitude toward constitutional law more than its content, were Thomas Reed Powell,
Learned Hand, and Felix Frankfurter, themselves students in the
same way of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Although I am a graduate
of the Harvard Law School, I am not a follower of the sect of Luddites now ensconced there. Although I am a member of the University of Chicago faculty, I claim no kinship with the economic school
of jurisprudence in fashion there now. I find the Chicago School
to be heartless and the Harvard School to be mindless. Both seem
to discount the importance of the individual and individuality in
our conception of a free and responsible democratic government.
Professor Paul Freund once began a lecture on Mr. Justice
Brandeis in this fashion:
A critic as unperceptive as he was unfriendly once remarked that
Charles Evans Hughes possessed one of the finest minds of the
eighteenth century. A more plausible observer might maintain that
Louis D. Brandeis had one of the finest minds of the nineteenth century. It is certain that most of the central features of the twentieth
century were antipathetic to his view of' man and man's
potentialities.3
I think of myself as the critic did of Hughes or perhaps as Freund
did of Brandeis. I find the problems of the mass urbanized society
in which the individual is subordinated to the class to which he
belongs or is assigned highly uncongenial. Except for modern
plumbing and sanitation, and the electric light, I cannot think that
much real progress has been made over the recent centuries. Indeed, I am so antediluvian as to be unable to use a word processor
or to understand any computer more complex than an abacus. You
are warned then that I may very well be viewing my subject
through the wrong end of the telescope.
Let me begin then by attempting to speak of the Constitution
itself as an expression of public policy. Just as with law, I am
informed, public policy may be divided into the two categories of
the substantive and the procedural.4 And when one looks at the
text of the Constitution, it is readily apparent that the public policy
expressed in it is essentially procedural rather than substantive.
3. P.A. FREUND, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 177 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds.
1956).
4. Freman, Public Policy, 23 INT'L ENCYCL. Soc. Sci. 204 (1969).
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In effect, it assigns or allocates the functions of making substantive public policy to different parts of government and specifies
the manner in which that policy must be made if it is to be
legitimate. It does not, generally, say what the substantive policy
thus created should be.
It is also evident from the text that the lion's share of the
substantive policy-making function in the national government was
assigned to the legislative branch, largely by article I, S 8, although
provision was made for recommendations to the legislature by the
President in article II. There is no suggestion of a policy-making
function for the judicial branch at all. Generally, the substantive
policy is left to be made by a branch of government authorized
to do so by the Constitution. If it says who shall make the rules
and how they should be made, it does not ordinarily say what those
rules should be.
Except to a seventeenth- or eighteenth-century mind, this may
come as a surprise. We now have in excess of four hundred and
sixty volumes of United States Supreme Court Reports which are
full to bursting with substantive constitutional commands. But, for
the most part, these are inventions or concoctions of the Supreme
Court rather than commands of the Constitution. I do not mean
to quibble. I know that there are ambiguities and interstices in
the constitutional text which have to be resolved by some authority
and the Supreme Court is perhaps as good an agency as any to
charge with this function. But it is one thing to fill a gap that the
founders left and another to make it. It is one thing to resolve
an ambiguity and still another to create an ambiguity in order to
resolve it. My revered master, revered by a few of us at least,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, found Justice Marshall's dictum in
M'Culloch v. Maryland,that "it is a constitution we are expounding,"5
"the single most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law-most important because most comprehensive and
comprehending."' When a great mind like Marshall's communicates
with another great mind like Frankfurter's, the communication may
be charged with meaning that it is not given to ordinary mortals
to comprehend. While I fully understand that a constitution is not
to be construed as a contract, or even as a statute, because of its
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
6. Frankfurter, supra note 1, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, at 534.
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function as a limit on government, Mqrshall's proposition has come
to signify that the words of the Constitution may be freely
deconstructed to suit the desires of the interpreter. Thus, Marshall's
words may, indeed, be the most important of all judicial dicta on
the Constitution, but if so they are also the most destructive of
the notion of the Constitution as a.limitation on governmental
authority. And surely the founders thought that they were creating
a national government of limited powers, limited by constitutional
provisions, in order to assure the liberty of the people. It will be
remembered that in M'Culloch, Marshall's opinion read the words
"necessary and proper" to mean not required and authorized but
only reasonable and relevant,7 i.e., necessary = reasonable, proper
= relevant: a more potent formula than E = mc2 . All this rested
on Marshall's idea that it would be illogical to establish a great
nation with limited powers, although that is exactly what the
creators had in mind in 1787.
That the enforcement of the procedural public policy expressed
in the Constitution was left to the judiciary by way of the power
of judicial review is, I think, a valid assumption both from legislative
history and the structure of the instrument. That is what Justice
Marshall held in Marbury v. Madison.' And that is all that he held
in Marbury, however much the Court likes to quote his more
expansive dicta: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."9 The Court has,
however, taken it upon itself to convert some of the clearly
procedural policy of the Constitution into a license to itself to write
substantive constitutional rules at will. The most egregious
examples of this transmutation are to be found in the Court's
readings of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth.
There is no suggestion in the origins of these provisions that
they had substantive rather than procedural meaning. In effect
they were restatements of what our English cousins have come
to call "the rule of law." Rules of substantive public policy were
not to be arbitrarily imposed but Were to be created only through

7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 323-25.
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. Id. at 177.
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observation of long-established legislative or judicial processes. Indeed, many of the elements of due process are specifically enunciated in article I, § 9, 10, and in the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
as the equal protection clause says, the same substantive rules
were to be applied to all persons within the jurisdiction. No one
was to be above the law, none to be below it. But that is not the
way the Justices have read these provisions.
Nor were they alone. For example, listen to Professor Felix
Frankfurter, as he then was, writing in The New Republic in 1924:
[T]hese broad "guarantees" in favor of the individual are expressed
in words so undefined, either by their intrinsic meaning, or by
history, or by tradition that they leave the individual Justice free,
if indeed they do not actually compel him, to fill in the vacuum with
his own controlling notions of economic, social, and industrial facts
with reference to which they were invoked. These judicial judgments
are thus bound to be determined by the experience, the environment, the fears, the imagination of the different justices. °
I am always tempted to substitute: "These judicial judgments
are thus bound to be determined by the experience, the environment, the fears, the imagination of a majority of nine wilful men
who would make themselves-indeed, have made themselvesthe prime policy-makers of the national government, at least, in
domestic affairs." I do not gainsay the accuracy of the Frankfurter
description of the judicial process under the fifth and fourteenth
it.
amendments. I merely decry
I should much prefer the Holmesian proposition:
I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can
do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express
prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State,
and that courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions
beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of
public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain."
Let you not misunderstand me or, of more importance, do not
misunderstand Mr. Justice Holmes. None knew better than he that
judicial judgments, and certainly those that changed existing rules
were, in fact, expressions of public policy. His opinions and his

10. Frankfurter supra note 1, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, at 163.
11. Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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writings are replete with acknowledgments of the role of policymaking in the judicial function. Thus, he wrote, while still on the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody
disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely are unanimously
accepted, and still more rarely, are capable of unanswerable proof.
They require a special training to enable anyone even to form an
intelligent opinion about them. In the early stages of law, at least,
they generally are acted on rather as inarticulate instincts than as
definite ideas for which a rational defence is ready. 2
To say that the judicial process at times is, like the legislative
process, simply a process of formulation of public policy, however,
does not acknowledge the limited area in which the judiciary is
charged with making substantive policy. Within the realm of the
common law, in the absence of Constitution and statute, Holmes
noted, "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined
from molar to molecular motions."1 That is a far different notion
from the conception of the judicial function assumed by the
Supreme Court under the due process clauses and the equal
protection clause.
Indeed, at the common law-and the common law is the rock
on which the Constitution was erected -it was long recognized that
the making of substantive public policy is primarily a legislative
and not a judicial function. Baron Parke, in the House of Lords,
put the classic attitude in these terms:
It is the province of the statesman and not of the lawyer to discuss
and of the Legislature to determine, what is best for the public good,
and to provide for it by proper enactments. It is the province of
the judge to expound the law, to declare public policy as he finds
it in the written and unwritten law. Public policy is a proper ground
for a decision only in the sense of the the policy of the law, not in
the sense of mere judicial notions as to what is best for the public
good. 4

12. Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
13. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. Egerton v. Brownlow, H.L. Cas. 1, 123, 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (1853).
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Let me invoke a more contemporary and less alien voice to the
same end. I refer here to Robert H. Jackson, whose book, The
Strugglefor JudicialSupremacy, was published almost simultaneously with his appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court in 1941.
In a chapter entitled "Government by Lawsuit," he wrote:
Judicial justice is well adapted to ensure that established legislative
rules are fairly and equitably applied to individual cases. But it is
inherently ill-suited, and never can be suited, to devising or enacting
rules of general social policy.
...Custom decrees that the Supreme Court shall be composed
only of lawyers, though the Constitution does not say so ....

Thus

government by lawsuit leads to a final decision guided by the learning and limited by the understanding of a single profession-the law.
It is no condemnation of that profession to doubt its capacity
to furnish single-handed the rounded and comprehensive wisdom to
govern all society.
...In stressing this I do not join those who seek to deflate the
whole judicial process. It is precisely because I value the role that
the judiciary performs in the peaceful ordering of our society that
I deprecate the ill-starred adventures of the judiciary that have recurringly jeopardized its essential usefulness.
Nor am I unmindful of the hard-won heritage of an independent
judiciary which for over two hundred years has maintained the "rule
of law" in England, the living principle that not even the king is
above the law. But -again, the rule of law is in unsafe hands when
courts cease to function as courts and become organs for control
of policy. 5
Of course, all this was said before our law schools began to be
taught by the Leonardo da Vincis who have mastered all knowledge
and who turn out students of such wisdom and omniscience that,
on graduation, they can be relied upon to produce Supreme Court
opinions and establish our fundamental social policies.
Supreme Court opinions

-

as I tell my undergraduate students - (I

need not tell my law students because they already know
everything when they arrive) are made up, in varying proportions,
of four elements, in addition to the statement of facts which may
or may not resemble those in the record. First, there are the propositions or principles allegedly derived from constitutional or
statutory language; second, judicial precedents which, these days,

15. R. H. JACKSON, THE

STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

288, 301, 321-23 (1941).
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are more likely to refer to lengthy obiter dicta rather than holdings
in previous cases; third, the practicalitiesof the situation which
license or inhibit the scope of judicial adventurism; and finally,
and not least, the personal predilections of each of the judges, for
it must be understood that, in Hamiltonian terms, the judiciary
now exerts WILL as well as JUDGMENT if not yet FORCE." Each
of the four elements, separately or in combination, may be subsumed under the rubric of public policy. So, too, may the opinions
reflect attitudes of the press, whether in the news columns or on
the editorial pages as when the Court turned turtle in the so-called
"released time cases"" and when the Court resorted to what it
called "public policy" to decide the recent Bob Jones8 tax exemption for racially segregatory religious school case. Of course, the
personal predilections of the Justices and the pressures of the press
are dealt with only sub silentio in the Court's opinions. Most often,
the opinions, both majority and minority, claim to be compelled
by constitutional or statutory language and judicial precedents.
The only point I am making here is that the Court has little
to rely on in the Constitution itself as a basis for its substantive
policy-making decisions under the due process and equal protection clauses. As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote to Frederick Pollock
as long ago as 1924: "The 14th Amendment is a roguish thing."1
There is, however, much in the Constitution to legitimate the
Court's policy-making in procedural areas, especially those marked
by the fourth through the eighth amendments and sections 9 and
10 of article I. It should be noted, moreover, that with regard to
civil and criminal procedure, the Court operates in fields in which
judges and lawyers may legitimately claim both the necessary
experience and expertise on which to base its judgments. So, too,
the allocation of policy-making powers among the branches of
government and the specific limitations can be found in the constitutional text. And, while it would be logical for each branch of
government to decide for itself which powers of policy-making were
allotted to it by the Constitution, the founding fathers did speak
in the conventions, both originating and ratifying, as if the courts

16.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
17. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
18. Bob Jones University v. Allen, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

19. 2

HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS

137 (M. Howe ed. 1942).
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would have the power of judicial review specifically to cabin each
branch within its constitutional limits, lest each arrogate to itself
more than its entitlement. Thus, while it is not properly the Court's
role to substitute its judgment on the merits of public policy for
those of the elected branches, it has been the accepted judicial
task to determine when one of them has exceeded its authority.
You may have noted an ellipsis in my remarks about the public
policy framed by the Constitution itself, for I have made no mention
of the first amendment, one of the more important expressions
of substantive policies. The problem here is not so much whether
the Constitution establishes a substantive rule, but what that
substantive rule is. And here we get into the very deep waters
of whether the framers' intent or contemporary conception is to
have priority of place. For reasons I cannot expand on now, I think
it fairly clear that the written document intended only to ban prior
restraint on speech and press, as Blackstone had pronounced, and
that the religion clauses endorsed the views of Jefferson and
Madison rather than Roger Williams. The real difficulty now derives
from the fact that the original purpose was only to limit the national
government and not the states. When it was discovered in the twentieth century that the first amendment was, indeed, incorporated
part and parcel into the fourteenth, and thus applicable to the
states, there was no way to read it in terms of what its authors
contemplated. What license this should have created for the Court
is hard to say, but the Court has followed its own fancy in the
application of the first amendment. And as Dr. Samuel Johnson
once put it: "All power of fancy over reason is a degree of
insanity."20
So much for the public policy made by the Constitution itself.
It created a structure of government not a code of governance.
The structure was to be self-regulating, largely through the check
by frequent popular elections. The Court was not envisioned as,
in Learned Hand's terms, a group of Platonic Guardians to supply
the ultimate wisdom if and when the other branches failed." But
all that I have said is based on the notions held only by troglodytes
these days, that we are governed by the Constitution, as it was

20. S. JOHNSON. RASSELAS XLIV (1759).
21. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1964).
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composed by the 1787 Convention and in the amendments thereto,
rather than by constitutional law which is a product of the cerebrations of the Justices of the Supreme Court. You should note that
even that keen "eighteenth-century mind," Charles Evans Hughes,
reported as early as 1908: "We are under a Constitution, but the
Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the
safeguard of our liberty and our property under the Constitution."'
Perhaps the "eighteenth-century" aspect of his statement is to be
found in his reference to the Court as a guardian of property rights
as well as liberty.
There is, however, another view of public policy that has to be
considered. This is public policy not in the sense of the rules of
governance for our society but public policy as the ambience within
which those rules are to be made, what Mr. Justice Holmes called,
in a different context, "a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"2 and
what an earlier generation might have referred to as the Zeitgeist,
which The Oxford English Dictionary defines as "the spirit or genius
which marks the thought or feeling of a period or age."24
There was such an ambience that surrounded the origins of the
Constitution. It may be expressed in terms of the end of monarchy
and autocracy and the beginning of responsible, representative
democracy. There was to be no privilege or prerogative for peers,
prelates, or princes. The governors of the people were to be selected
by the people, to come from the people, and to return to the people,
preferably after short terms of office. All to the end that government not be tyrannical, wilful, or arbitrary. The power of each
branch was to be severely cabined by an elaborate system of checks
and balances of each branch of government by the others as well
as by the people. The national government was to be one of limited,
delegated powers, sharing sovereignty with the states. Strong state
power was thought to be of the essence of freedom of the people.
In a way, the original Zeitgeist was to be found in the spirit of
the Declaration of Independence, which has remained a shadowy
background to, if not a part of, constitutional rule.
If, however, there has been one consistent theme that has
dominated the development of constitutional law, and not least of

22. L.M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGES 204 (1951).
23. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222.
24. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY v. XII, 88 (1933 & photo. reprint 1970).
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Supreme Court adjudication, throughout history, it has been the
persistent devotion to centralization of all government power. There
can be no doubt that what the constitution writers created was
a federalism. Protest as you will, however, and as politicians do,
federalism is now totally gone from the American constitutional
structure. There are today no governmental powers that can be
exercised by state government except under the authorization or
with the acquiescence of the national government. Surely today
state government is only a reminder of our earlier Constitution,
"just as," to use a Holmesian metaphor, "the clavicle in the cat
only tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collar
bone was useful."25 Oh, there are remnants of state sovereignty:
each state hat two representatives in the Senate and the electoral
college continues as an all but useless function in terms of states.
But in fact, we are no less a unitary government than France or
Japan. Administrative functions are left to the states and there
are some who would like to return some national burdens if not
national income to them. Policy-making is, however, in Washington,
D.C., and it is exercised down to the lowest -levels of the police
power, even with regard to maximum highway speed and minimum
drinking age. And, while the Court has been the effective means
of bringing this result about, it should be remembered that the
Court did not thrust power on the national government, it only
legitimated it. But legitimate it, it did.
I do not mean to tell you that ancient battles are not still
rehearsed from time to time in the Supreme Court. In some manner or other Mr. Justice Rehnquist persuaded his brethren to bow
in favor of state exemption from compliance with federal wage
and hour regulations for its own employees in National League of
8 on the theory that there was meaning in the tenth
Cities v. Usury"
amendment. But what was haled as a watershed proved no more
than a hillock. The 1976 decision was overruled in another five
to four decision by the Court on February 19, 1985.27 Mr. Justice
Blackmun changed his mind. "Equal Justice under Law" reads the
facade of the. Supreme Court building, but its true motto should
be "e pluribus unum."
25. O.W. HOLMES, BOOK NOTES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS 9 (1936).
26. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
27. Garcia v. San Antonio Metroplitan Transit Authority, No. 82-1913, N.Y. TIMES. Feb.
20, 1985, at Sec. A13, col. 3 (U.S. Sp. Ct. Feb. 19, 1985); Cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226 (1983).
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No doubt most students who are, these days, taught no American
history would be surprised to learn that the members of the federal
and state conventions of 1787-88 fought heatedly over the question whether provision should be made for any area where no state
would be sovereign and where a national capital could be
established. There was strong objection to exclusive jurisdiction
for the national government over any territory within the United
States. For, to them, the absence of state government meant the
absence of liberty. There was also a great fear that a national capital
would mean a national court in the sense of a Versailles, where
the inhabitants would be totally aloof from the people and where
government would exist only to benefit the courtiers. I wonder
whether, if these disputants of 1787-88 could return for a visit to
Washington, D.C. today, they would realize their fears about a national capital leeching on the vitals of American society had been
baseless.
The principal judicial means for nationalization was the persistent reconstruction of the commerce clause, first, by expanding
the meaning of commerce and then by expanding the meaning of
interstate commerce, and finally by including all local commerce
if it could be said to affect or compete with interstate commerce - as
it always could. So far as substantive public policy is concerned,
it would now be possible for the national government to enact most
of its laws under the Supreme Court's version of the commerce
clause. And the negation of the reserved powers of the states was
pretty well marked by the legitimation of the grant-in-aid as means
of formulating state policy. The sixteenth amendment had created
the deep pocket that Uncle Sam could use to bribe states to bring
their public policies in line with the desires of the central government. In 1923, in an opinion by the arch-conservative Mr. Justice
Sutherland, the extortion implicit in grants-in-aid was validated
as not contravening the tenth amendment. 8 The ultimate primacy
of the nation over the states is not a recent innovation of our judicial
Constitution makers.
No other doctrine has brooded so omnipresently over the Court
as its commitment to nationalization, whatever the Constitution
might say or its authors may have intended. But there have been
equally strong policies also more influential on Supreme Court decisions than the mere words -of the basic document. Consider the
28. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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notion of laissez-faire which together with social Darwinism
provided the Zeitgeist for the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The label "freedom of contract" was invoked in substitution for the words of the Constitution. The zenith of laissez-faire
public policy was probably reached in Lochner v. New York,' where
the Court struck down, by a vote of five to four, a state law setting
a maximum ten-hour day and sixty-hour week for bakery workers.
It was in this case that Mr. Justice Holmes uttered what may
be his most famous dissent:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I
agreed with the theory, I should desire to study it further and long
before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my
duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement
has nothing to do with the right of the majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that
state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways
which we as legislators might think injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which equally interfere with liberty of contract.
..The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics. . . .[A] constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire"
The fact is that Holmes was wrong. As of 1905, the Constitution did embody Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, just as surely
as if it had been included in haec verba in the terms of the document. That was the public policy of the day that was a higher law
than the Constitution. And, perhaps it will give many of you some
comfort to realize that many of the academics recently appointed
to the federal appellate courts by President Reagan -at least some
of whom stand in line for promotion to the high court, with or
without Reverend Falwell's approval-would think that a
renaissance of Lochner would not be a bad thing. For them, the
overriding public policy is to be found in Adam Smith's Wealth
of Nations. Indeed, much of our history seems to show an oscillation between an overriding belief that wealth is virtue and poverty
is sin and its opposite that wealth is sin and poverty is virtue.

29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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In any event, so far as laissez-faire in the realm of economic regulation is concerned, it died a resounding death with the Great Depression. What its phoenix-like qualities may be remains to be seen.31
If, however, Supreme Court intolerance of economic regulation
is to be reversed, it is going to take some doing. Modern Supreme
Courts do nothing by halves and, with a single major exception
that was later overruled, 2 the Warren and Burger Courts'
scutcheons remain unblotted by any case in which economic regulations have been invalidated as violative of the due process or equal
protection clauses. At the moment, it would seem that, however
arbitrary the economic regulation, it does not violate the
Constitution.
Since the demise of economic due process, which followed the
Roosevelt Court-packing plan, no equivalently broad jurisprudential spirit has hovered over the judicial policy-making function. The
Stone Court was prone to favor labor unions, but that was in accord
with the directions of Congress. It showed greater concern for some
rights of criminal defendants, especially with regard to coerced
confessions, while revealing the usual ambivalence toward the
fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions, an ambivalence
that has persisted to this day. The equal protection clause remained
largely the last resort of desperate litigants. The war powers of
both the President and the Congress were exalted, especially while
the war was being waged, but even afterwards. (Perhaps the Court
had learned a practical lesson from the inept attempts of the Civil
War Court to limit Lincoln's war powers.) The concept of the
developing welfare state was defended. The rights of aliens suffered in a xenophobic atmosphere. The Cold War tested the limits
of freedom of political speech. Unpopular religious minorities were
afforded protection and a strict notion of separation of church and
state was born.
On the whole, however, during both the Stone and Vinson Courts,
the judiciary stayed in its basket. When it made public policy, it
did so interstitially. It mostly paid due homage to the constitutional structure and congressional mandates. The nation no less

31. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34.
32. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 306 (1976).
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than the Court worried about the limits of tolerance for those
ideologies against which we had done battle. To what degree should
we afford freedom to those who, given the chance, would take that
very freedom from us? To what degree was the threat to our polity
and civility greater from domestic demagogues and bigots than
from alien subversion?
The Court was regarded as liberal, if not radical, primarily
because it sustained rather than thwarted the public policies of
big government. In Clinton Rossiter's unfortunately accurate term,
"constitutional dictatorship,"3 marked by the expanded power of
the executive and the bureaucracy at the expense of Congress was
largely unchallenged by the judiciary, except for the landmark Steel
Seizure Case,34 in which a politically divided Court favored the
powers of Congress over the claims of the President. That was
probably the last victory for congressional power in any contest
waged with the President in the courts.
The Court performed its tasks during the Stone-Vinson era more
or less within the confines marked by the Constitution. Except
for the persistent over-riding commitment to centralization of
government authority, which has never disappeared, there seemed
to be no higher law directing its conclusions. With the arrival of
the Warren Court, or what could be called, ironically perhaps, the
Eisenhower Court, after the President whose appointments included,
in addition to the Chief Justice, Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
Harlan, the Justices began to march to a new drumbeat.
Egalitarianism replaced laissez-faire as the judicial Zeitgeist and
with egalitarianism came the revival of the notion of judicial
supremacy which was the essence of economic due process, but
this time in an even more virulent form.
I do not propose here to rehearse even the names of the myriad
of innovative, not to say revolutionary, decisions of the Warren
and Burger Courts. They are all of sufficiently recent memory that
the names of a few should suffice to refresh your recollection. Brown
35 of course, is probably the single most
v. Board of Education,
important decision of the Supreme Court since M'Culloch v.

33. C.

RoSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN

DEMOCRACIES

(1948).

34. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Maryland, although its holding did not change the concept of the
equal protection clause, that a state was required not to classify
persons according to race. Indeed, Brown probably does not even
deserve the accolade of spawning the equal protection clause revolution. Those laurels properly belong to a Vinson Court decision,
Shelley v. Kramer," which outlawed enforcement of racial restrictive covenants. But, as Alexander Bickel said, "Brown v. Board
of Education was the beginning,"" and it was the beginning of the
extensive doctrine of egalitarianism that coloured so much of the
Supreme Court jurisprudence that followed in its wake. Baker v.
Car 3 ' insinuated the doctrine of "one-man, one-vote" (now "oneperson, one vote") into a Constitution which had clearly left the
question of legislative apportionment to state legislatures.
Mapp v. Ohio"9 began the conversion of the Supreme Court
reports into the equivalent of a loose-leaf code of criminal procedure
to be followed by both the state and federal courts. Miranda v.
Arizona" marked a technique of enacting so-called prophylactic
rules for police behavior, which made it irrelevant to any particular
case whether the defendant had been harmed by police misfeasance.
Contrary to newspaper reports, the Burger Court has been
largely an extension of the Warren Court both in its activism and
its egalitarianism. Again, I would offer here just a few examples.
But for a capacity to make constitutional bricks without any constitutional straws, certainly no prior case can be equaled by that
of the abortion decisions." However much I like the results-and
I do-I can find no justification for their promulgation as a constitutional judgment by the Supreme Court. So, too, the gutting
of the elements of the common law jury has been without justification. The devotion to egalitarianism may be found not only in the
Burger Court's extension of Brown far beyond its rationale, but
in its treatment of the gender discrimination cases, and its
favoring-if not always consistently-of expansive notions of affirmative action.
36. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
37. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970).
38. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP.
CT. REV. 252.

39. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Surely, there have been places where the Burger Court has
refused to expand Warren Court notions as its predecessor might
have done. It refused. to compel states to extend equal contributions to all students in all school districts." And some criminal
procedure doctrines have not been carried to their logical conclusions. But, as Professor Vincent Blasi, who is anything but a conservative constitutionalist, wrote in his book entitled "The Burger
Court, The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't": "the 1970s and early
1980s may well be looked upon as the period during which the
activist approach to judicial review solidified its position in
American judicial practice .... By almost any measure the Burger
Court has been an activist court. 43
The problem with contemporary judicial activism is not, however,
merely its rejection of legislative and administrative public policy
because it conflicts with its own. It lies, rather, in the extension
of authority from the power to negate legislative policy-the most
that could be claimed for the constitutional authorization of judicial
review-to a power to initiate and enforce the legislative policy
that it creates. It can no longer be said that the judiciary is merely
juridical in its power; it is now legislative and executive as well.
Courts not only ban racial segregation in schools, they administer
school systems, subordinating all other educational values to the
attempt to create racially proportional urban schools. They have
not been very effective in achieving their goals, witness
Washington, D.C., Philadelphia,, Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, Los
Angeles, etc., but not for lack of trying. They allocate and reallocate
federal and state welfare funds. They no longer merely condemn
overcrowded prisons, they undertake to manage them, with about
the same success as they have had with the schools. They set
priorities in expenditure of state budgets and determine which form
of treatment is best for the mentally deranged or retarded. They
impose punishments on litigants in civil suits without the requirement of legislative authorization or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. They bind persons by judgments who have never been
parties to the lawsuits in which their rights are purportedly
adjudicated. What the judges have not managed to do is to bring

42. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
43. V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT

WASN'T
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their own dockets under control by rapid and efficient disposition
of cases.
The federal judiciary is exercising all the authority that the
elected representatives in Congress have, although they are not
representative of any constituency nor responsible to any. A
legislator is chosen by, and removable by, his constituency. A
federal judge chooses the constituency he wishes to represent and
is, for all practical purposes, not removable at all.
There are many among us who have applauded this accretion
of power by the judiciary. Some, like Judge J. Skelly Wright, reason
from the "rightness" of the judicial actions to the validity of the
judicial power." Presumably, if the courts turn from their
egalitarian bent, Judge Wright will no longer justify their authority
to act. Some, like Professor Abram Chayes, find the expansion of
judicial power justified by the necessity to control government
by bureaucracy, which is no more democratic than are the courts."
A.A. Berle, of New Deal Brain Trust fame, reasoned that the
expanded meaning of the equal protection clause requires the
assumption of authority to enforce the new meaning. The egalitarian
Zeitgeist is thus indissolubly linked with judicial activism. It was
in 1969 that Berle wrote:
Ultimate legislative power within the United States has come to rest
in the Supreme Court of the United States.
...

The process by which a measure of legislative power devolved

on the Supreme Court is interesting. It is the product of a mandate
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, multiplied by the forced
intrusion of laws into fields of activity originally supposed to be outside statist action.
The second stage of the revolution came when, faced with
state "inaction," the federal courts assumed the task of filling the
vacuum, remedying the failure. In plain English, this meant undertaking by decree to enact the rules that state legislation has failed
to provide. The second phase was the really revolutionary development and, incidentally, set up the Supreme Court as a revolutionary
committee."
44. See Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769 (1970).

45. Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
46. A. BERLE, POWER 345, 347, 350 (1969).

HARV.
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Berle worried, however, that the Court having lifted itself by
its own bootstraps might, to change the metaphor, be hoist by its
own petard. He acknowledges the problem is one of the Court as
a "benevolent dictatorship," and his words are highly reminiscent
of the classic argument of James Bradley Thayer" for judicial
restraint:
Acquiescent acceptance of any benevolent dictatorship in time
deadens the public -to its responsibility for apprehending needs and
dangers and demanding that their elected executives and legislators
take appropriate measures. As John Stuart Mill observed, it compromises the future. Nonacceptance, on the other hand, piles up
political pressures focused against the institution itself. Judicial
legislation is not a substitute for political and legislative institutional
processes. The will of the most enlightened Court is not the same
as the will of the elected representatives of the people, and may
cease to be the will of the people itself. Acceptance of its mandates
based on respect for the Court is not the same as acceptance of active
laws commanding popular assent after political debate."8
My coda is simple and relatively short. I think that the Justices
of the Supreme Court, like most officers of government, suffer from
a chronic case of arrogance complicated by the bureaucratic
watchwords, "the rules don't apply to me." The disease is endemic.
It affects professors and lawyers, social and physical scientists,
and, certainly candidates for public office, those who run them,
and those who serve them. Unfortunately there appears to be no
antitoxin. But, take heart. As Ralph Waldo Emerson once said:
"These times of ours are serious and full of calamity, but all times
are essentially the same.""
The notion of the Supreme Court as the ultimate maker of policy
in our democracy, as the savior of the nation's Constitution through
its discretion to change it, is not a new one. For example, in 1906,
Holmes wrote to Lord Pollock:
Brooks [Adams] at present is in a great stir and thinks a world crisis
is at hand, for us among others, and that our Court may have a last
word, as to who shall be the master in the great battle between
few. I think this notion is greatly exaggerated
the many and the
50
and half-cracked.
47. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV.

L.

REV.

129 (1893).

48. A. BERLE, supra note 45, at 402.
49. R. EMERSON, UNCOLLECTED LECTURES 14 (1932).
50. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LOTTERS, supra note 19, at 124.
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If, however, I can decry the arrogation of power by the judiciary
as both illegitimate and largely fruitless as a solvent for our more
intractible social and economic problems, I am still at a loss to
offer an articulable standard for imposing external constraints on
the Justices that will not at the same time destroy their legitimate
and necessary function of inhibiting at least some of the grosser
forms of unconstitutional adventurism undertaken by the other
two branches of the national government and by the states. And
so I am left, as I shall leave you, with the words that are part
of our heritage from Alexander Bickel, who was brought up in the
same school as was I:
"We do not confine the judges, we caution them. That, after all, is
the legacy of Felix Frankfurter's career." 1
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